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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 59 2014 NUMBER 2
Notes
NO CLEAR WINNER: APPRAISING THE IMBALANCES OF
DELAWARE’S QUASI-APPRAISAL REMEDY AFTER
BERGER v. PUBCO CORP.
NICHOLAS R. CARROLL*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent and highly-publicized $24.9 billion buyout of Dell, Inc.,
activist investor Carl Icahn—believing the buyout offer to be underval-
ued—urged fellow Dell shareholders to prepare to exercise appraisal
rights for their shares should the buyout be approved.1  Appraisal statutes
generally allow dissenting minority shareholders in a corporate merger or
buyout situation to bring suit to obtain the judicially determined fair value
for their shares.2  In traditional long-form merger or buyout transactions,
such as the Dell deal, the exercise of appraisal rights is one of several alter-
natives available to minority shareholders interested in challenging the
merits of the transaction.3
* Certified Public Accountant (Inactive); J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova
University School of Law; M.B.A. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of
Business.  This Note is dedicated to the memory of Richard R. Carroll Sr. in
appreciation for his admiration of a good argument and a good laugh.
1. See Michael J. De La Merced, Ichan’s Latest Gamble at Dell: Appraisal Rights,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 10, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/07/10/icahns-latest-gamble-at-dell-appraisal-rights/?_r=1 (explaining that
Mr. Ichan’s uncommon request could yield higher payout for minority sharehold-
ers).  The buyout was ultimately approved by a majority vote of the Dell sharehold-
ers. See Brett Molina, Dell Shareholders Approve $25 Billion Buyout, USA TODAY (Sept.
12, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/09/12/dell-buy
out-vote/2803907/ (reporting result of Dell vote).
2. See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1642
(2011) (discussing general purpose of appraisal statutes).
3. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, For Dell Investors, a Safety Valve, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/business/for-dell-
investors-a-safety-valve.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining exercising appraisal
rights as interesting alternative for dissenting shareholders compared with tradi-
tional shareholder suits based on breach of fiduciary duties); see also Robert B.
Schumer et al., Quasi-appraisal: The Unexplored Frontier of Stockholder Litigation?, 12
M&A JOURNAL 1, 2 (2012), available at http://www.paulweiss.com/media/103314/
(243)
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In short-form merger situations, however, after the seminal Delaware
Supreme Court opinions in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.4 and Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corp.,5 judicial appraisal became the sole remedy available to
minority shareholders wishing to challenge the merits of the short-form
transaction, absent fraud or illegality.6  The exclusivity of the appraisal
remedy for minority shareholders in short-form merger situations was de-
cided, in part, based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the purpose of the Delaware short-form merger statute.7  That purpose
was to provide a parent corporation, owning at least ninety percent of the
outstanding shares of each class of stock of another corporation, with a
mechanism to effectuate a merger unilaterally.8
Delaware courts have held, however, that even when unilaterally effec-
tuating a short-form merger, the majority shareholder corporation still
owes certain fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders.9  These duties
7719347_1.pdf (acknowledging various types of litigation remedies available to mi-
nority shareholders in long-form mergers).  Generally, under Section 251 of Dela-
ware General Corporation Law (the long-form merger statute), in the event of a
proposed arms-length merger transaction, approval from a majority of sharehold-
ers is required for the transaction to proceed. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251
(West 2013) (codifying requirements of shareholder approval in long-form merger
transactions); see also Richard T. Hossfeld, Short-Form Mergers After Glassman v. Uno-
cal Exploration Corp.: Time to Reform Appraisal, 53 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1338 (2004)
(explaining shareholder approval in long-form merger transactions ensures share-
holders receive adequate value for their shares).
4. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
5. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
6. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (holding plaintiff’s monetary remedy in
cash-out merger situation should ordinarily be confined to appraisal proceeding);
see also Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (“[A]bsent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the
exclusive remedy available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form
merger.”).  Under Section 253 of Delaware General Corporation Law, a short-form
merger may be effectuated when a parent corporation owns at least ninety percent
of the outstanding shares of each class of stock of a subsidiary. Compare DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (codifying requirements of short-form merger transactions), and
Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1338 (explaining summary procedure for short-form
merger as compared to traditional long-form merger), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251 (codifying requirements of shareholder approval in long-form merger trans-
actions), and Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1338 (explaining shareholder approval in
long-form merger transactions ensures shareholders receive adequate value for
their shares).  For a further discussion of the Delaware long-form merger statute
requirements, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fos-
tering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Explora-
tion, 58 BUS. LAW. 519, 525 (2003) (noting short-form merger statute “provides
parent corporations with the means for unilaterally effectuating mergers with their
subsidiaries”).
8. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 245 (“[T]he very purpose of the statute is to pro-
vide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority share-
holder’s interest in the enterprise.”); see also Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1365
(explaining benefits of short-form mergers for parent corporations).
9. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (“Although fiduciaries are not required to
establish entire fairness in a short-form merger, the duty of full disclosure re-
mains . . . .”); see also Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 307 (Del. Ch. 2005)
2
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include the duty of full disclosure.10  In the event parent corporations vio-
late their fiduciary duties in short-form merger transactions, Delaware
courts have provided minority shareholders with a quasi-appraisal rem-
edy.11  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, in Weinberger and Glass-
man, had left open the question of what the appropriate procedural
application of this quasi-appraisal remedy would be.12  This is an impor-
tant question because it greatly impacts both majority and minority
shareholders.13
The appropriate quasi-appraisal remedy should balance the majority
shareholders’ interest in effectuating a merger unilaterally with the minor-
ity shareholders’ right to make an informed appraisal decision.14  Should
Delaware courts loosely regulate fiduciary duties in short-form merger situ-
ations, minority shareholders may lack the necessary information to make
an informed appraisal decision.15  Without adequate information, minor-
ity shareholders would be vulnerable to the parent corporation’s interest
(describing majority shareholder’s duty of disclosure in short-form merger transac-
tions); Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750, at *5 (Del.
Ch. July 5, 1995) (same).
10. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (discussing majority shareholder’s duty of
disclosure in short-form merger transactions).
11. See Geis, supra note 2, at 1642 (noting quasi-appraisal has been judicial
response to short-form merger transactions effectuated with violations of fiduciary
duties); see also Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 1 (“Generally, quasi-appraisal has
been recognized in cases in which a corporation fails to make disclosures that di-
rectly affect the stockholders’ decision whether or not to seek appraisal.”).
12. See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 138 (Del. 2009) (stating issue of
what remedy should be available to minority shareholders in case of violation of
fiduciary duty is one of first impression for Delaware Supreme Court).
13. See Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1359 (noting generally appraisal remedies
should seek to balance risks of oppression by majority against harassment by mi-
nority); see also Joseph M. Coleman, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Freeze-Outs:
Questions of Valuation and Exclusivity, 38 SW. L.J. 775, 776 (1984) (noting appraisal
proceedings “prevent majority shareholders from abusing their favorable position”
in merger transactions).  The importance of the quasi-appraisal remedy is also sup-
ported by the Delaware courts’ increased use of the remedy outside of short-form
merger transactions. See, e.g., Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 2 (describing Dela-
ware courts’ consideration of quasi-appraisal as protection for minority sharehold-
ers in sign and consent transactions).  These cases are also notable as they suggest
Delaware courts are willing to forgo pre-closing remedies of disclosure issues and
defer to the protection provided to minority shareholders through the quasi-ap-
praisal proceeding. See id. at 4 (discussing evolution of quasi-appraisal remedy).
14. See Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1360 (discussing need for more balanced
appraisal remedy).
15. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000) (finding minority
shareholders must be able to make informed decision whether to accept buyout
price or seek appraisal of their shares); see also Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (noting parent corpora-
tion has “duty . . . to disclose all facts material to minority stockholders’ decision
whether to accept the short form merger consideration or seek an appraisal” (cit-
ing Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 114 (Del. 1992))).
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in cashing out the minority at the lowest possible price.16  Conversely,
should Delaware courts establish a jurisprudence that enforces fiduciary
duties too strictly, majority shareholders effectuating short-form mergers
would be continuously exposed to harassment in the form of quasi-ap-
praisal claims.17  The issue of determining the appropriate procedural ap-
plication of the quasi-appraisal remedy was one of first impression for the
Delaware Supreme Court and was addressed in Berger v. Pubco Corp.18
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Berger seems, on its face, to
benefit minority shareholders in short-form merger transactions.19  This
16. See Aronstam et al., supra note 7, at 521 (explaining imposition of fiduci-
ary duties guards against risk that majority shareholders could unilaterally imple-
ment transactions to detriment of minority shareholders).
17. See Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1359 (noting generally appraisal remedies
seek to balance risks of oppression by majority against harassment by minority); see
also Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 2 (advocating quasi-appraisal remedy should be
limited “to avoid the tipping of the balance of the law” in favor of post-merger
litigation).  Vice Chancellor Laster recently addressed the issue of disclosure claim
harassment by minority shareholders and the importance of a balanced equitable
remedy:
As we know from scholarly studies, the past decade has witnessed a
dramatic transformation in the nature of public company M&A litigation.
In 2010, 84.2 percent of announced deals attracted lawsuits.  In 2010 and
2011, according to Cornerstone Research, 91 percent attracted lawsuits.
According to the data for 2011, in the same study, 96 percent of deals
valued at $500 million or more attracted lawsuits.  That’s compared to 53
percent in 2007.
As these volumes have increased, merits-related outcomes have de-
creased.  So of the 447 transactions involving public companies valued at
a $100 million plus, between 2005 and 2010 for which data is available,
69.8 percent resulted in a settlement.  The remaining 135 were dismissed
by the Court.  So all of those were either settled or dismissed.  Of the
cases that settled, 74.7 percent were supplemental disclosures only . . . .
That was a sharp increase over 1999 through 2000 when . . . the rate of
disclosure-only settlements was only 10 percent.
As I have observed, viewed against the background of these statistics,
the increase in disclosure-only settlements is troubling.  Disclosure claims
can be settled cheaply and easily, creating a cycle of supplementation that
confers minimal, if any, benefits on the class.  I don’t think for a moment
that 90 percent—or based on recent numbers, 95 percent of deals are the
result of a breach of fiduciary duty.  I think that there are market imbal-
ances here and externalities that are being exploited.
What this means is that this Court needs to think carefully about
balancing.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–12, Stourbridge Inv. LLC v. Bersoff, C.A. No.
7300-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2012) (discussing appropriate quasi-appraisal
remedy).
18. 976 A.2d 132, 133 (Del. 2009) (“The issue on this appeal is what remedy is
appropriate in a ‘short form’ merger . . . where the corporation’s minority stock-
holders are involuntarily cashed out without being furnished the factual informa-
tion material to an informed shareholder decision whether or not to seek
appraisal.”).
19. See Geis, supra note 2, at 1642 (noting that after Berger quasi-appraisal be-
came more convenient than traditional appraisal for dissenting minority share-
holders); see also Andrew J. Nussbaum, Delaware Supreme Court Establishes Equitable
4
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Note, however, analyzes the imbalances of the quasi-appraisal remedy es-
tablished in Berger and the detrimental effects that remedy will have on
both the interest of parent corporations and the rights of minority share-
holders in short-form merger transactions.20  Part II of this Note provides
a brief background of Delaware’s quasi-appraisal jurisprudence with a fo-
cus on short-form mergers and the emergence of diverging procedural
applications of the quasi-appraisal remedy.21  Part III details the facts and
procedural posture of Berger and analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court’s
holding.22  Part IV addresses the imbalances of the Delaware Supreme
Court’s approach in Berger in regards to protecting minority shareholder
rights while also preserving the interest of majority shareholders in short-
form merger transactions.23  Finally, Part V concludes by suggesting that
the Delaware Supreme Court revisit the holding of Berger to establish a
more balanced quasi-appraisal remedy.24
II. AN OVERVIEW OF QUASI-APPRAISAL JURISPRUDENCE LEADING UP TO
BERGER V. PUBCO CORP.
Quasi-appraisal is a judicially created remedy available to minority
shareholders who are deprived of the full right to statutory appraisal.25  As
Delaware courts have held that statutory appraisal is the sole remedy avail-
able to minority shareholders in a short-form merger situation, quasi-ap-
praisal has become an important protection of minority shareholders’
rights when the majority inequitably prevents the minority from making a
fully informed statutory appraisal decision.26  Delaware courts, however,
have struggled to balance the statutorily protected interests of the majority
Relief in Short Form Mergers, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(July 26, 2009, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/tag/berger-v-
pubco-corp/ (reasoning benefits provided to minority shareholders from Berger
decision “may encourage increased litigation following short-form mergers”).
20. For a discussion of the detrimental effects of the quasi-appraisal remedy
handed down in Berger, see infra notes 105–21 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of Delaware’s quasi-appraisal jurisprudence and the
emerging diversion in application of the quasi-appraisal remedy, see infra notes
43–68 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the facts, procedural posture, and the Delaware Su-
preme Court’s analysis in Berger, see infra notes 72–104 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the effects of Berger on minority shareholder rights and
the interest of majority shareholders in short-form merger transactions, see infra
notes 105–21 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the conclusion of this Note, see infra notes 142–47 and
accompanying text.
25. See Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discuss-
ing appropriate remedy available to minority shareholders in case of “technical
non-compliance with the appraisal statute” by majority shareholder); see also Geis,
supra note 2, at 1648 (explaining rationale for creation of quasi-appraisal remedy
by Delaware courts).
26. See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 145 (Del. 2009) (recognizing
quasi-appraisal and its enforcement of statutory and fiduciary duties related to
short-form mergers as important protection for minority shareholders); see also
5
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with the rights of minority shareholders in the application of the quasi-
appraisal remedy.27
A. Majority Shareholder Interest and the Purpose of the Delaware Short-Form
Merger Statute
The Delaware Supreme Court initially addressed the purpose of the
Delaware short-form merger statute in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.28
The court in Stauffer held the purpose of the short-form merger statute
was to provide parent corporations with a means of unilaterally eliminat-
ing minority shareholders’ interest in an enterprise.29  Giving weight to
the legislative intent of the Delaware short-form merger statute, the court
in Stauffer further held that the exclusive remedy for minority sharehold-
ers in a short-form merger would be judicial appraisal.30  The exclusivity of
Nussbaum, supra note 19 (discussing benefits provided to minority shareholders
from Berger decision).
27. See Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1359 (noting generally appraisal remedies
seek to balance risks of oppression by majority against harassment by minority); see
also Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 315 (holding minority shareholders must opt in and
escrow a portion of merger proceeds to secure quasi-appraisal proceeding); Geis,
supra note 2, at 1648 (acknowledging Delaware Supreme Court in Berger wrestled
with open questions related to quasi-appraisal procedure). But see Nebel v. Sw.
Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995)
(holding quasi-appraisal is opt-out proceeding and minority shareholders are not
required to escrow any merger proceeds).
28. 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962), overruled by Roland Int’l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d
1032 (Del. 1979) (“As to Stauffer, we agree that the purpose of § 253 is to provide
the parent with a means of eliminating minority shareholders in the subsidi-
ary . . . .”); see id. at 80 (discussing purpose of Delaware short-form merger statute).
29. See id. (determining purpose of Delaware short-form merger statute “is to
provide the parent corporation with means of eliminating the minority share-
holder’s interest” unilaterally).
30. See id. (holding in disputes related to value arising from effectuation of
short-form merger, appraisal is exclusive remedy available to dissenting minority
shareholders).  The Delaware Supreme Court in Stauffer established that the court
will protect majority shareholder parent corporations’ legitimate interest in being
able to unilaterally effectuate short-form mergers against breach of duty challenges
from minority shareholders. See id. (indicating that “power of the parent corpora-
tion to eliminate the minority [interest] is a complete answer to . . . breach of
trust” claims).  Later, the Delaware Supreme Court diverged from the premise es-
tablished in Stauffer that the purpose of the Delaware short-form merger statute
was to allow controlling shareholders to unilaterally eliminate minority interests.
See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977) (“[T]he fiduciary obli-
gation of the majority to the minority stockholders remains and proof of a pur-
pose, other than such freeze-out, without more, will not necessarily discharge it.”),
overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).  In Singer, the su-
preme court established a business purpose test applicable to appraisal actions and
found that a controlling shareholder breaches its fiduciary duty to minority share-
holders if it effects a merger for the sole purpose of eliminating the minority share-
holders. See id. (holding short-form merger made solely for purpose of freezing
out minority shareholders is violation of fiduciary duty).  However, any precedent
established by the Singer decision was short-lived as the Delaware Supreme Court in
Weinberger overruled Singer and re-established the principles of Stauffer by eliminat-
ing the business purpose test and again limiting the minority stockholders re-
6
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the appraisal remedy protects the interest of the majority shareholder in
unilaterally effectuating the transaction.31
The Delaware courts have uniformly interpreted the purpose of the
short-form merger statute over time.32  With this purpose in mind, Dela-
ware courts have consistently protected a majority shareholder’s ability to
unilaterally eliminate the minority interest through a short-form merger
by making statutory appraisal the exclusive remedy available to objecting
minority shareholders.33  Delaware courts have, however, carved out some
exceptions to the exclusivity of the statutory appraisal remedy in short-
form merger situations.34  The most notable exceptions are cases of fraud,
illegality, or breach of fiduciary duty.35  The rationale behind allowing
these exceptions is that, in cases of fraud, illegality, and breach of fiduciary
duties, minority shareholders are unable to make an informed appraisal
decision.36
B. Minority Shareholders’ Rights to Informed Decisions and the Fiduciary Duty
of Disclosure
Delaware courts have also consistently protected the right of minority
shareholders to make an informed appraisal decision in short-form
course in short-form mergers to a remedy known as quasi-appraisal. See
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (noting plaintiff’s mone-
tary remedy in short-form merger situation should be confined to quasi-appraisal
proceeding); see also Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 245–47
(Del. 2001) (describing history of Delaware jurisprudence related to exclusivity of
appraisal in context of short-form mergers).
31. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (finding that in order to give effect to pur-
pose of short-form merger statute, appraisal must be “exclusive remedy available to
a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger”).
32. See id. at 245–48 (citing Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80) (recognizing purpose of
short-form merger statute as announced in Stauffer); Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80
(“[T]he very purpose of the statute is to provide the parent corporation with a
means of eliminating the minority shareholder’s interest in the enterprise.”); Nebel,
1995 WL 405750, at *5 (discussing purpose of short-form merger statute).
33. See, e.g., Glassman, 777 A.2d at 245 (noting exclusivity of appraisal remedy
protects legislative intent of short-form merger statute); Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80
(same).
34. See, e.g., Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247 (indicating equitable remedies other
than statutory appraisal would be available in cases involving fraud or illegality);
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (same); Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80 (same).
35. See, e.g., Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247 (finding statutory appraisal is exclusive
remedy for minority shareholders objecting to short-form mergers except in cases
of fraud or illegality); Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80 (same); see also Glassman, 777 A.2d at
248 (determining duty of disclosure remains in short-form merger transactions).
36. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (“Where the only choice for the minority
stockholders is whether to accept the merger consideration or seek appraisal, they
must be given all the factual information that is material to that decision.”); see also
Nussbaum, supra note 19 (noting only obligation of parent company in short-form
merger is to provide minority shareholders with sufficient information to make
informed appraisal decision); Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 2 (discussing require-
ment for corporations to make disclosures that directly affect stockholder’s ability
to make informed decision about appraisal).
7
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merger situations.37  To ensure that minority shareholders are provided
with the requisite information to make an informed decision, Delaware
courts impose a fiduciary duty of loyalty on majority shareholders.38  As
part of this duty of loyalty, majority shareholders effectuating a short-form
merger must disclose any information material to the minority sharehold-
ers’ appraisal decision.39  Information is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the information
important in making the appraisal decision.40  In the context of a short-
form merger, the statutory appraisal remedy cannot adequately address
situations in which the minority is left uninformed due to a breach of the
majority’s duty of full disclosure.41  To address the inadequacies of the
statutory appraisal remedy in these situations, the Delaware courts have
fashioned an equitable quasi-appraisal remedy.42
37. For a further discussion of the need for minority shareholders to make an
informed decision whether to seek appraisal, see supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
38. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (discussing duty of loyalty owed by directors
of Delaware corporations to their shareholders).
39. See id. at 703 (holding majority shareholders withholding information ma-
terial to transaction is breach of fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders); see
also Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (finding fiduciaries owe duty of full disclosure to
minority stockholders in short-form merger); Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1348 (ex-
plaining parent corporation must satisfy duty of full disclosure in short-form
merger).
40. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 925 (Del. 2000) (discussing material-
ity standard in context of breach of fiduciary duties arising from merger transac-
tion); see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (“An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))).  The Delaware Chancery Court
has also found omission of certain information can be per se material if that infor-
mation is required to be provided by statute. See Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp. Inc., Civ. A.
No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (holding statutory re-
quirement that corporation include current appraisal statute in its short-form
merger notice makes that information per se material).
41. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (explaining appraisal remedy may not be
adequate in certain cases and equitable remedy may be fashioned); see also Nebel,
1995 WL 405750, at *2 (discussing limitations of appraisal remedy in short-form
merger situations).  In these situations the claim is that the breach of duty has left
minority shareholders unable to make an informed appraisal decision. See id. at *5
(discussing plaintiff’s claims related to breach of fiduciary duty).  Therefore, the
appraisal remedy, without the requirement of additional disclosures, cannot be an
adequate remedy for that claim. See id.  The exclusiveness of the appraisal remedy
leaves minority shareholders especially vulnerable in short-form merger situations
as, technically, the merger has taken place before the majority is required to dis-
close any information. See Geis, supra note 2, at 1648 (explaining short-form merg-
ers become effective before any disclosures are made to minority shareholders); see
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (codifying requirements of short-form merger).
For a further discussion of the minority shareholders’ right to make an informed
appraisal decision in short-form merger situations, see supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
42. See Geis, supra note 2, at 1648 (explaining judicial response to inadequa-
cies of statutory appraisal has been to craft quasi-appraisal remedy); see also Schu-
8
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C. The Quasi-appraisal Remedy
The Delaware judiciary developed the quasi-appraisal remedy to ad-
dress situations in which minority shareholders had been deprived of the
full right to statutory appraisal.43  Unfortunately, the Delaware courts have
inconsistently applied the procedural aspects of the quasi-appraisal rem-
edy.44  This inconsistency stems in part from the struggle of Delaware
courts to fashion an equitable remedy that balances the rights of minority
shareholders with the interests of parent corporations in short-form
mergers.45
1. Origins of Quasi-appraisal
The Delaware Supreme Court first recognized quasi-appraisal as an
equitable remedy available to cashed-out minority shareholders in Wein-
berger.46  The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger found that as minority
shareholders had tendered their shares on a materially uninformed basis,
they were deprived of their right to statutory appraisal.47  The court in
Weinberger also established the ability of Delaware courts to fashion equita-
ble remedies in cases where appraisal would be an inadequate remedy due
to fraud or violations of fiduciary duties.48
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger did not intend for quasi-
appraisal to become the alternative remedy in all cases of corporate trans-
actions involving fraud or breaches of fiduciary duties.49  Nevertheless, in
mer et al., supra note 3, at 1 (noting quasi-appraisal remedy has been implemented
in short-form merger cases where fiduciary breaches duty of disclosure).
43. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714–15 (discussing quasi-appraisal remedy now
available to minority shareholders); see also Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d
305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discussing purpose of quasi-appraisal remedy).
44. For a discussion of the inconsistent application of the quasi-appraisal rem-
edy, see infra notes 53–68 and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of the importance of balancing the rights of minority
shareholders with the interests of majority shareholders in short-form mergers, see
supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
46. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714–15 (discussing quasi-appraisal remedy now
available to minority shareholders); see also Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 2 (ac-
knowledging quasi-appraisal remedy was first recognized in Weinberger).
47. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (concluding shareholder vote on tender
offer was uninformed and therefore meaningless); see also Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 311
(discussing Weinberger holding).
48. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (discussing other situations in which statu-
tory appraisal remedy may not be appropriate); see also Coleman, supra note 13, at
789 (discussing Weinberger’s enablement of Delaware courts to fashion equitable
remedies).  Shortly after Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court again supported
the discretion of Delaware courts in these matters when it held that there are cer-
tain situations in which, even absent fraud or illegality, the court may establish
equitable remedies other than judicial appraisal. See Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt
Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1100 (Del. 1985) (concluding appraisal is exclusive
remedy only if minority stockholders’ complaints are limited to judgmental factors
of valuation).
49. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (enumerating limited types of cases to
which quasi-appraisal remedy would apply).  The court in Weinberger initially only
9
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a number of post-Weinberger cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has used
its Weinberger-supported discretion to extend the application of the quasi-
appraisal remedy beyond the scope envisioned by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Weinberger.50  Despite its increased application of the quasi-ap-
praisal remedy, the Chancery Court had difficulty consistently fashioning a
quasi-appraisal proceeding that balanced the majority shareholders’ inter-
ests with the minority shareholders’ rights.51
2. Inconsistent Application of Quasi-appraisal Remedy in the Context of Short-
Form Mergers
In two Delaware Chancery Court cases, Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp.
Inc.52 and Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc.,53 the court found that parent corpora-
tions executing short-form merger transactions had breached their duty of
disclosure to minority shareholders.54  In both cases, the court also found
that the statutory appraisal remedy was inappropriate and chose to offer
minority shareholders a quasi-appraisal remedy.55  The courts differed,
however, in what they held to be the appropriate procedural application
of the quasi-appraisal remedy.56
intended the quasi-appraisal remedy to apply to similarly situated cases currently
being litigated so those courts may apply the more liberalized valuation proce-
dures established in Weinberger. See id. (noting limitations on application of quasi-
appraisal remedy); see also Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 2 (“The Weinberger court
did not attempt to create a new remedy apart from statutory appraisal . . . .”).  In
fact, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger and in subsequent decisions
stressed the exclusivity of the statutory appraisal remedy except in limited circum-
stances. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (noting remedy available to minority share-
holders should ordinarily be confined to statutory appraisal proceeding albeit with
more liberalized valuation approach); see also Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (reaffirming Weinberger’s statements about
scope of appraisal).
50. See, e.g., Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 312 (applying quasi-appraisal remedy to
short-form merger situation involving breach of fiduciary duty although statutory
appraisal proceeding including Weinberger’s liberalized valuation approach was
available); see also Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13618, WL 405750, at *7
(Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (same); Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 3 (discussing variety
of cases in which quasi-appraisal remedy was applied or was considered).
51. For a full discussion of the inconsistent application of the quasi-appraisal
remedy, see infra notes 52–68 and accompanying text.
52. Civ. A. No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995).
53. 873 A.2d 305 (Del. Ch. 2005).
54. See Nebel, 1995 WL 405750, at *6 (finding parent corporation violated its
fiduciary duty of disclosure); see also Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 307 (finding majority
stockholder breached its fiduciary duty).
55. See Nebel, 1995 WL 405750, at *7 (holding appropriate remedy for disclo-
sure violation in question was quasi-appraisal); see also Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 307
(“The court must look beyond the [general appraisal] statute to fashion a proper
remedy.”).
56. See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 137 (Del. 2009) (discussing dif-
ferences between Nebel and Gilliland); see also Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313 (discussing
procedural aspects of quasi-appraisal remedy absent in Nebel).
10
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a. The Nebel Approach to Quasi-appraisal
The Chancery Court in Nebel granted minority shareholders a quasi-
appraisal remedy in which shareholders were neither required to opt in to
the quasi-appraisal proceeding, nor were minority shareholders required
to escrow any of the proceeds they had received from the merger.57  The
opt-out proceeding established by the court in Nebel essentially created a
class action proceeding in which the entire class of minority shareholders
would be included in the quasi-appraisal proceeding brought by any indi-
vidual minority shareholder.58  Although the Nebel court neglected to pro-
vide sufficient rationale for its decision to establish an opt-out proceeding,
later opinions have suggested that this approach properly balances proce-
dural burdens on majority and minority shareholders.59
b. The Gilliland Approach to Quasi-appraisal
In Gilliland, the Delaware Court of Chancery again addressed the is-
sue of what the appropriate remedy should be in the case of a short-form
merger effectuated with violations of the majority shareholder’s duty of
disclosure.60  The parties in Gilliland agreed that the transaction was effec-
tuated with a breach of the duty of full disclosure.61  The parties also
agreed that quasi-appraisal would be the appropriate remedy.62  The par-
ties disagreed, however, on the proper procedural application of the
quasi-appraisal remedy; specifically, they disagreed as to whether minority
shareholders would be required to opt in and to escrow a portion of their
57. See Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 3 (discussing Chancery Court’s holding
in Nebel); see also Berger, 976 A.2d at 137 (detailing quasi-appraisal proceeding re-
sulting from Nebel decision). But see Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 312 (claiming Nebel as-
sumed, without deciding, that quasi-appraisal would be opt-out proceeding).
58. See Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 3 (describing Nebel remedy as “class-
wide quasi-appraisal”).
59. See Nebel, 1995 WL 405750, at *7 (granting quasi-appraisal remedy but not
discussing procedural aspects). But see Berger, 976 A.2d at 143 (noting opt-out pro-
ceeding does not burden majority shareholder but relieves procedural burden on
minority shareholders).
60. See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 307 (describing issue to be resolved).
61. See id. (noting question of breach was addressed in previous opinion).
The breach of the fiduciary duty stemmed from the fact that the majority share-
holder in Gilliland had not provided any disclosures related to the company’s fi-
nancial condition prior to the execution of the short-form merger transaction. See
id. at 308 (discussing basis for prior court’s finding of breach of fiduciary duty of
disclosure).  Although in Gilliland most minority shareholders had been provided
with adequate financial disclosures pursuant to a recent tender offer, some of
which were publicly available, the court held that all minority shareholders in-
volved in the short-form merger transaction must be provided with at least sum-
mary financial information, trading data of the shares, and a reference to publicly
available sources from which additional data could be obtained. See id. (discussing
minimum requirements for adequate financial disclosure).
62. See id. at 307 (noting disagreement was focused solely on procedural is-
sues related to quasi-appraisal remedy).
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merger proceeds.63  Ultimately, the Court of Chancery in Gilliland held
that the appropriate quasi-appraisal remedy required minority sharehold-
ers to both opt in and to escrow a portion of the merger proceeds.64
The court’s rationale for the opt-in and escrow requirements was that
this remedy properly reflects the legislative intent of the short-form
merger statute and the modicum of risk inherent in a statutory appraisal
proceeding.65  The court noted that, like in a statutory appraisal proceed-
ing, the opt-in proceeding requires that the minority shareholders make a
choice to participate in the action.66  Further, the court reasoned that the
escrow requirement reflects the risk of the statutory appraisal proceeding
in that minority shareholders may actually lose value should the judicially
determined valuation be less than the proposed merger consideration.67
III. BERGER V. PUBCO CORP.
In Nebel and Gilliland, the Delaware Court of Chancery handed down
conflicting opinions regarding the appropriate procedural remedy to ad-
dress violations of fiduciary duties in the context of a short-form merger.68
The Delaware Supreme Court, ruling on a matter of first impression, at-
tempted to address this conflict in Berger v. Pubco Corp.69  In finding for the
63. See id. at 308–10 (explaining disagreement in regards to quasi-appraisal
procedure).  The plaintiffs in Gilliland called for a class-wide quasi-appraisal action
where all minority shareholders eliminated in the short-form merger would be
automatically joined in the appraisal proceeding. See id. at 308–09 (detailing plain-
tiffs’ argument).  The defendant, on the other hand, called for a more limited
quasi-appraisal remedy wherein plaintiffs must opt in to the action individually and
must escrow any proceeds received from the merger. See id. at 309 (detailing de-
fendant’s argument).
64. See id. at 313 (deciding quasi-appraisal should be opt-in remedy in which
minority shareholders involved are required to escrow portion of merger
proceeds).
65. See id. at 313–14 (accepting defendant’s arguments); see also Berger v.
Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 138 (Del. 2009) (discussing rationale behind court’s
remedy in Gilliland).
66. See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313 (explaining rationale for opt-in
requirement).
67. See id. (explaining rationale for escrow requirement); see also Schumer,
supra note 3, at 1 (noting in statutory appraisal proceeding plaintiffs “bear the risk
that the court will appraise the stockholder’s shares at a lower value than the
merger consideration”).  The Gilliland court also noted the escrow requirement
will incentivize minority shareholders to make a more reasoned appraisal decision
and would avoid a windfall to minority shareholders who would have chosen to
accept the merger consideration if given the choice. See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313
(discussing benefits of escrow requirement).
68. For a discussion of the conflicting applications of the quasi-appraisal rem-
edy, see supra notes 51–68 and accompanying text.
69. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 139–40 (detailing conflicting holdings of Nebel and
Gilliland).  The Chancery Court’s holding in Nebel favors plaintiff dissenting minor-
ity shareholders as it reduces the procedural burdens of having to opt in to the
quasi-appraisal action and having to escrow cash that has already been received.
See id. at 143 (explaining Nebel’s quasi-appraisal remedy is potentially less burden-
some then Gilliland approach).  Conversely, the Court of Chancery’s holding in
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss2/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-APR-14 12:01
2014] NOTE 255
plaintiff, the Delaware Supreme Court held that in a short-form merger
where the controlling shareholder failed to disclose material facts, the ap-
propriate remedy would be an opt-out quasi-appraisal proceeding with no
requirement that minority shareholders escrow any portion of the merger
proceeds.70
A. Facts
Pubco Corporation (Pubco) was a Delaware corporation whose com-
mon shares were not publicly traded.71  The Pubco majority shareholder,
owning over ninety percent of outstanding shares, bought out the interest
of the minority shareholders via a short-form merger.72  Under Delaware’s
short-form merger statute, the board of directors must adopt a resolution
approving the merger and supply minority shareholders with a notice in-
forming them the merger has occurred and instructing them that they
should seek appraisal.73  The short-form merger statute also requires that
the minority shareholders receive a copy of the current Delaware appraisal
statute.74  Additionally, Delaware common law requires the majority share-
Gilliland favors defendant majority shareholders in that it would limit their poten-
tial liability in a quasi-appraisal action to only those shareholders that choose to
opt in. See id. (discussing benefits of opt-in proceeding to defendant
corporations).
70. See id. at 143–44 (discussing appropriate quasi-appraisal procedure).
71. See id. at 134 (noting Pubco’s status as Delaware corporate entity).  That
Pubco was not a publicly-traded company is important as most publicly-traded
companies are subject to enhanced periodic public disclosure requirements which
would generally satisfy the substantive disclosure requirements of the fiduciary
duty of disclosure. See, e.g., Bradley R. Aronstam & David E. Ross, Retracting Dela-
ware’s Corporate Roots Through Recent Decisions: Corporate Foundations Remain Stable
While Judicial Standards of Review Continue to Evolve, 12 DEL. L. REV. 1, 23 (2010)
(discussing Pubco’s lack of public disclosures factoring in to Berger court’s
decision).
72. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 134 (“Under the short form merger statute, the only
relevant corporate action required to effect a short term merger is for the board of
directors of the parent corporation to adopt a resolution approving a certificate of
merger, and to furnish the minority shareholders a notice advising that the merger
has occurred and that they are entitled to seek an appraisal under [Title 8, Section
262].  Section 253 requires that the notice include a copy of the appraisal statute,
and Delaware case law requires the parent company to disclose in the notice of
merger all information material to shareholders deciding whether or not to seek
appraisal.” (citations omitted)).
73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2013) (describing required proce-
dures to effectuate short-form merger).  In Berger, the majority shareholder, Robert
H. Kanner, was also the sole director of the corporation. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 134
(describing role of Robert H. Kanner).
74. See tit. 8, § 253 (describing required procedures to effectuate short-form
merger); see also Berger, 976 A.2d at 135 (noting that Delaware law requires control-
ling shareholder to attach copy of appraisal statute to short-form merger notice).
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holder disclose to the minority shareholders all information material to
shareholders deciding whether to seek appraisal.75
In Berger, the plaintiff minority shareholder received a notice from the
parent corporation that Pubco’s controlling shareholder had effectuated a
short-form merger.76  This notice disclosed information about Pubco’s
business, the names of its officers and directors, the number of shares and
classes of stock outstanding, a description of related business transactions,
and copies of Pubco’s most recent interim and annual unaudited financial
statements.77  Notably missing from the notice were disclosures regarding
the company’s plans or prospects for the future, any meaningful discus-
sion of Pubco’s operations, or disclosures of finances by division or line of
business.78  Additionally, the copy of the Delaware appraisal statute pro-
vided to the minority shareholders was outdated.79
B. Procedural Posture
The Court of Chancery found, and the Delaware Supreme Court
agreed, that the disclosures provided to the minority shareholders pro-
vided no significant financial information with which an informed deci-
sion regarding appraisal could be made.80  Additionally, the disclosures
provided no information as to how the majority shareholder had deter-
mined the buyout price.81  Ultimately, the Chancery Court found, and the
75. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 134 (noting additional requirements for appropri-
ate effectuation of short-form merger).  For a further discussion of the materiality
standard applied by Delaware courts, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
76. See id. (describing information provided to minority shareholders pursu-
ant to short-form merger).  The short-form merger procedure is only available
when at least ninety percent of each class of the outstanding shares is owned by
another corporation. See tit. 8, § 253 (codifying required procedures to effectuate
short-form merger); see also Berger, 976 A.2d at 134 (noting short-form merger can
only be effectuated by parent corporation).  Therefore, Robert H. Kanner formed
a wholly-owned subsidiary, Pubco Acquisitions, Inc., and transferred his Pubco
shares to that entity. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 134 (describing procedures performed
by controlling shareholder to effectuate short-form merger).
77. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 134 (describing information provided to minority
shareholders pursuant to short-form merger).
78. See id. at 135 (identifying information not provided to minority sharehold-
ers).  Specifically, the unaudited financial statements indicated Pubco held a “size-
able amount of cash” but provided no information as to the prospective uses of
that cash. See id. (identifying information not provided to minority shareholders).
Further, the description of the company provided to shareholders contained only
five sentences and included vague statements such as “[t]he company owns other
income producing assets.” See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (describing vagueness of information provided).
79. See id. (noting appraisal statute had been updated with changes that be-
came effective two months prior, but notice provided to minority shareholders did
not reflect those changes).
80. See id. at 138 (explaining disclosure violations were not at issue on
appeal).
81. See id. at 136 (determining that given mix of available information valua-
tion method was substantially likely to alter total mix of available information).
14
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Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, that there were two distinct disclosure
violations: first, the failure to disclose the valuation methodology used in
calculating the merger price, and second, the outdated copy of the ap-
praisal rights statute provided to minority shareholders.82  It is important
to note that the Chancery Court found that the requirement to disclose
the methodology used to value the shares was limited to the specific facts
of the case at hand.83  Further, the Chancery Court made clear that only
the valuation methodology need be disclosed, and no disclosure of valua-
tion inputs or assumptions was required.84
The Court of Chancery held that because the notice did not disclose
material facts, the minority shareholders were entitled to a quasi-appraisal
remedy.  The Chancery Court held further that shareholders who elected
to pursue appraisal must “opt in” to the proceeding and escrow a portion
of the merger proceeds they received.85  The plaintiff appealed to the su-
preme court, arguing that the Chancery Court erred as a matter of law by
82. See id. (discussing Chancery Court’s findings of two distinct disclosure vio-
lations); see also Evangelos Kostoulas, Case Law Developments: Terms of Equity Capital
Raised in Unfair Transaction Reformed by Court, DEL. TRANSACTIONAL & CORP. L. UP-
DATE (Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP), Winter 2009, at 3, available at http:/
/www.youngconaway.com/files/Publication/fb241fe0-9aff-46eb-a169-324a449816
c9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dd7dcf9c-a816-4c64-8e5e-0248657325be
/DECorpUpdateWinter2009.pdf (noting Court of Chancery in Berger found viola-
tion in that short-form merger notice failed to disclose process for determining
price of shares).
83. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 136 (citing Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civil Action No.
3414-CC, 2008 WL 2224107, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008)) (discussing disclosure
violations).  The valuation methodology was material in this case because the
merger notice provided inadequate financial disclosures and no other financial or
company information was publicly available. See id. (citing Berger, 2008 WL
2224107, at *3) (explaining disclosure of valuation methodology would substan-
tially alter total mix of available information).  For a further discussion of the stan-
dard of materiality, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
84. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 136 (“This does not mean that Kanner should have
provided picayune details about the process he used to set the price; it simply
means he should have disclosed in a broad sense what the process was . . . .” (quot-
ing Berger, 2008 WL 2224107, at *3)).  Although the Delaware Supreme Court did
not directly address disclosure requirements, it did support the Chancery Court’s
findings as evidenced by its quotation of the portion of the Chancery Court’s opin-
ion relevant to the inadequacy of the disclosure. See id. (discussing materiality of
valuation methodology).
85. See id. at 138 (explaining quasi-appraisal remedy handed down by Chan-
cery Court).  Specifically, the Chancery Court’s quasi-appraisal remedy called for
the dissenting shareholders to be furnished with all material information necessary
to make an informed appraisal decision. See id. (same).  Further, the Chancery
Court’s quasi-appraisal remedy closely reflected the approach applied by the Gilli-
land court in that the remedy required that minority shareholders who wish to
participate in the quasi-appraisal action opt in to the proceeding and escrow a
portion of the merger proceeds they had received. See id. (same).  The Delaware
Supreme Court noted that the Chancery Court’s purpose for the opt-in and escrow
requirements was to “replicate [the] modicum of risk” inherent in a general ap-
praisal proceeding. See id. (discussing Chancery Court’s holding).
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requiring the minority shareholders to opt in to the appraisal action and
to escrow a portion of the merger proceeds.86
C. Delaware Supreme Court Analysis and Holding
Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court in Berger held that the ap-
propriate quasi-appraisal remedy was an opt-out remedy in which minority
shareholders were not required to escrow any portion of their merger pro-
ceeds.87  In arriving at this conclusion, the court analyzed a number of
different procedural alternatives.88  The court addressed the Nebel and Gil-
liland approaches, as well as two other procedural alternatives not previ-
ously addressed by the Chancery Court.89
1. Newly Developed Quasi-appraisal Alternatives
Although only two alternatives to the quasi-appraisal remedy had
been previously presented in Delaware jurisprudence, the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Berger analyzed four possible remedies.90  The supreme
court raised and dismissed two alternative remedies that had not previ-
ously been discussed in the Court of Chancery.91  The first was a repli-
cated appraisal remedy in which the quasi-appraisal remedy accurately
matched the general statutory appraisal proceeding.92  The court rejected
86. See id. (explaining basis of plaintiff’s appeal).  Although the issue of what
constitutes a disclosure violation was not on appeal, the supreme court did not
take issue with the Chancery Court’s statements that the addition of the valuation
methodology to the total mix of available information may have constituted an
adequate disclosure. See generally Kevin Miller, More on Berger v. Pubco: Disclosure
in Notices of Appraisal Rights and Merger Proxies, DEALLAWYERS.COM (July 20, 2009,
7:37 AM), http://www.deallawyers.com/Blog/2009/07/most-commentators-on-
berger-v.html (noting Delaware Supreme Court took no issue with Chancery
Court’s findings in regards to disclosure requirement).
87. For a further discussion of the holding of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Berger, see infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
88. For a further discussion of the procedural alternatives discussed by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Berger, see infra notes 91–104 and accompanying text.
89. For a further discussion of the procedural alternatives discussed by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Berger, see infra notes 91–104 and accompanying text.
90. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 139 (“[F]our possible alternatives present them-
selves, of which only two are advocated by either side.  The remaining two alterna-
tives are advocated by no party.  We nonetheless identify and consider them,
because to do otherwise would render our analysis incomplete.”).
91. See id. (noting two alternatives discussed which were advocated by neither
side and not previously discussed in Chancery Court).
92. See id. at 139–40 (discussing replicated appraisal approach).  The repli-
cated appraisal remedy would duplicate precisely the procedure of the general
appraisal statute. See id. at 141 (discussing replicated appraisal).  Under the repli-
cated appraisal approach, the minority shareholders would receive all information
determined to be material to making an informed appraisal decision. See id.
(same).  The shareholder would then make a formal demand for appraisal, which
would include remission of stock certificates to the corporation and the entire
merger proceeds received in the short-form merger. See id. (same).  The corpora-
tion would then have the option of settling with dissenting shareholders or com-
16
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this replicated appraisal approach due to the unacceptable burden placed
on the minority shareholders.93
The second alternative the court addressed was to dismiss the quasi-
appraisal proceeding altogether and find that the breach of duty rendered
the short-form merger statute inapplicable.94  Under this approach an eq-
uity remedy would be determined using an entire fairness review.95  The
court rejected this alternative, noting that to proceed with an entire fair-
ness review would disregard the legislative intent of the short-form merger
statute as interpreted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stauffer and
Glassman.96
2. Quasi-appraisal Alternatives Developed by the Chancery Court
The court then shifted its focus to the two quasi-appraisal remedies
previously discussed by the Court of Chancery in Nebel and Gilliland.97
The supreme court in Berger explained that the duty of disclosure and the
quasi-appraisal remedy that arises from a breach of that duty provide im-
portant protections for minority shareholders.98  Therefore, the court
mencing a formal appraisal proceeding. See id. (same).  The benefit of this
approach is that it “would give maximum effect to the legislative intent” of the
drafters of the Delaware short-form merger statute as recognized in Stauffer and
Glassman. See id. (noting strongest argument favoring replicated appraisal).
93. See id. at 141 (discussing flaws of replicated appraisal which led to its rejec-
tion).  The court also discussed the Chancery Court’s acknowledgement in Gilli-
land that requiring shareholders to return all merger proceeds would be unfair as
it would expose the minority shareholders to the corporation’s credit risk for the
duration of the appraisal proceeding. See id. (discussing flaws of requirement for
minority shareholders to escrow all merger proceeds).
94. See id. at 140 (discussing alternative to rendering short-form merger stat-
ute inapplicable).
95. See id. (explaining implications of entire fairness proceeding).  The argu-
ment for the application of the more liberal entire fairness review is that the fiduci-
ary’s failure to make adequate disclosures would result in a remedy wherein the
legality of the merger itself would be called into question. See id. (noting this rem-
edy is applied in long-form merger cases where there is violation of fiduciary duty).
96. See id. at 141 (noting entire fairness is least favored alternative).  The basis
of the disclosure requirement is to enable minority shareholders to make an in-
formed decision about seeking appraisal, and providing a non-appraisal remedy
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the imposition of the duty. See id. (dis-
cussing purpose of fiduciary duty of full disclosure).  For a further discussion of
the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legislative intent of the short-
form merger statute, see supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
97. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 142 (discussing quasi-appraisal alternatives).  The
court noted both the Nebel and Gilliland quasi-appraisal alternatives would entitle
minority shareholders to receive supplemental disclosures allowing them to make
an informed appraisal decision. See id. (noting similarities of two quasi-appraisal
alternatives).  Further, the court noted both quasi-appraisal alternatives would al-
low minority shareholders to recover the difference between the merger proceeds
and the fair value of their shares “without having to establish the controlling share-
holders’ personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id.
98. See id. at 145 (explaining protections afforded by duty of disclosure and
quasi-appraisal remedy).
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held that access by minority shareholders to the quasi-appraisal remedy
should not be restricted by requirements that minority shareholders opt in
or escrow a portion of their merger proceeds.99
The supreme court in Berger found that the opt-in requirement
handed down in Gilliland potentially burdened minority shareholders de-
siring to seek an appraisal recovery, as it poses a risk of forfeiture.100  Addi-
tionally, the supreme court did not support the requirement from
Gilliland that minority shareholders escrow a portion of the merger pro-
ceeds.101  The supreme court explained that fairness requires that major-
ity shareholders forfeit their statutory right to retain the merger proceeds
if they deprive the minority of material information.102  Therefore, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Berger established a class action quasi-appraisal
remedy with no requirement that minority shareholders escrow any por-
tion of the merger proceeds.103
IV. APPRAISING THE IMBALANCES OF THE QUASI-APPRAISAL REMEDY AFTER
BERGER V. PUBCO CORP.
Although the outcome of Berger benefited the minority shareholder
plaintiffs in that case, Berger also suggests a limitation on minority share-
holder rights in future short-form merger situations.104  Specifically, the
supreme court limited the disclosure requirements imposed on majority
shareholder corporations wishing to execute a short-form merger.105  Ad-
ditionally, the gratuitous quasi-appraisal remedy granted to minority
shareholders will make it difficult for Delaware courts in the future to re-
quire additional disclosures without tipping the balance of fairness too far
99. See id. (finding quasi-appraisal remedy ordered by Chancery Court was
legally erroneous).  Ultimately, the court found that the opt-in requirement cre-
ated a significant burden on the minority shareholders. See id. at 143 (discussing
burdens imposed by opt-in and escrow requirements).  Conversely, an opt-out
structure would avoid the increased burden to minority shareholders while creat-
ing no additional procedural burden for the parent corporation. See id. (noting
under either alternative parent corporation would be able to quickly identify class
of dissenting shareholders).  Further, although the defendants argued that the es-
crow requirement best mimics the risks associated with a general appraisal pro-
ceeding, the court found that the quasi-appraisal proceeding that operated in the
fairest way does not require minority shareholders to escrow a portion of the
merger proceeds. See id. at 143–44 (analyzing fairness of escrow requirement).
100. See id. at 143 (arguing if minority shareholder fails to appropriately opt
in they forfeit opportunity to seek appraisal); see also Aronstam & Ross, supra note
71, at 24 (discussing holding of Berger).
101. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 144 (rejecting escrow requirement).
102. See id. (providing rationale for rejection of escrow requirement).
103. See id. at 143–44 (discussing appropriate quasi-appraisal procedure).
104. See id. at 136 (explaining majority does not have to provide valuation
details but only broad sense of valuation process); Miller, supra note 86 (noting
Berger opinion suggests level of required disclosure is not as detailed as required by
previous Chancery Court opinions).
105. See Miller, supra note 86 (explaining increased disclosure requirements
suggested by Chancery Court decisions).
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in favor of minority shareholders.106  Ultimately, Delaware courts must im-
pose increased disclosure requirements to ensure that minority sharehold-
ers are provided with sufficient information to make an informed
appraisal decision.107  However, if these increased disclosure require-
ments are imposed, Delaware courts must also revisit the quasi-appraisal
remedy established in Berger to ensure the quasi-appraisal remedy does not
expose parent corporations in short-form merger situations to overly bur-
densome litigation.108
A. Increasing Disclosure Requirements
Commentators have highlighted a number of benefits to minority
shareholders resulting from the supreme court’s decision in Berger.109  Ul-
timately, however, the disclosure threshold established in Berger does not
ensure that minority shareholders will be provided with sufficient informa-
tion to make an informed decision whether to seek appraisal.110  The only
substantive disclosure violation noted in Berger was the parent corpora-
tion’s failure to disclose the valuation methodology used to establish the
merger price.111  Therefore, the court suggests that although the minority
shareholders had access to only limited unaudited financial data, an inade-
quate description of company operations, and no future projections, if the
minority shareholders had knowledge of the valuation methodology, they
could have made an informed decision as to whether to seek appraisal.112
106. See Nussbaum, supra note 19 (discussing increased litigation risk associ-
ated with quasi-appraisal remedy handed down in Berger).
107. See Miller, supra note 86 (noting Berger opinion suggests level of required
disclosure is not as detailed as required by previous Chancery Court opinions).
108. See Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 6 (explaining if quasi-appraisal be-
comes widely available to address post-closing disclosure claims, litigation costs
could increase dramatically for parent corporations).
109. See Geis, supra note 2, at 1649 (highlighting benefits to minority share-
holders of quasi-appraisal as class-action and rejection of requirement that minor-
ity shareholders escrow any portion or proceeds); see also Nussbaum, supra note 19
(discussing how benefits provided to minority shareholders from Berger decision
will encourage increased litigation following short-form mergers).
110. See Miller, supra note 86 (explaining disclosures required by Berger are
not as detailed as requirements in previous Chancery Court decisions).
111. For a further discussion of the disclosure violations found in Berger, see
supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.  The court characterized the second
disclosure violation as a technical disclosure violation. See Berger v. Pubco Corp.,
976 A.2d 132, 145 (Del. 2009) (“If only a technical and non-prejudicial violation of
[Title 8, Section 253] had occurred, the result might be different.  In some circum-
stances, for example, where stockholders receive an incomplete copy of the ap-
praisal statute with their notice of merger, the Gilliland remedy might arguably be
supportable.”).
112. See Miller, supra note 86 (discussing financial disclosures made by parent
company in Berger and additional financial disclosures required by court).  For a
further discussion of the financial and operating disclosures provided to the mi-
nority shareholders in Berger, see supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.  For a
further discussion of the additional disclosure requirements addressed by the
court in Berger, see supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.  For further discus-
19
Carroll: A Win For the Little Guys?: Appraising Minority Shareholder Right
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-2\VLR201.txt unknown Seq: 20 30-APR-14 12:01
262 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 243
1. Trust or Verification
The court justifies the limited disclosure requirement by noting that
the minority shareholders’ decision to seek appraisal turns, at least par-
tially, on a question of trust.113  However, shareholders also chose to verify
the adequacy of the merger consideration by performing independent val-
uations.114  The inadequacy of the disclosure requirement in Berger results
from the minority shareholders’ inability to independently calculate an
accurate valuation of their shares.115  The inability of minority sharehold-
sion of the purpose of the fiduciary duty of disclosure, see supra note 38 and ac-
companying text.
113. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 136 (“Where, as here, a minority shareholder
needs to decide only whether to accept the merger consideration or to seek ap-
praisal, the question is partially one of trust . . . .”).
114. See Aronstam et al., supra note 7, at 552 (explaining subsidiaries often
retain independent financial and legal experts to achieve best merger price for
minority shareholders).  Also, given the high cost of the appraisal proceeding, it is
important for minority shareholders to form independent valuations to weigh
their chances of success. See id. at 547 (“[I]t has been argued that smaller share-
holders are economically unable to justify seeking the appraised value of their
shares because the costs associated with pursuing an appraisal action will often
times exceed the potential for recovered gains . . . .”).  The need for minority
shareholders to rely on independent valuations instead of trust is further high-
lighted by incentives, inherent in the appraisal process, for parent corporations to
discount the merger consideration. See, e.g., id. at 548 (describing negative incen-
tives inherent in appraisal process).
115. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) (noting
appraisal remedy is applicable to disputes over value), overruled by Roland Int’l
Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1983); In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders
Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 203 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing material information to share-
holders independently valuing shares); Miller, supra note 86 (noting disclosure
requirements established by Berger were more limited than disclosure requirements
established by previous Chancery Court decisions).  In two notable Chancery
Court cases, the Chancery Court discussed the fiduciary duty of disclosure in
merger situations and seemed to suggest more robust disclosure requirements. See
Miller, supra note 86 (discussing Chancery Court decisions in regard to disclosure
requirements); see also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449
(Del. Ch. 2002) (holding that summary of methodologies used and ranges of val-
ues generated by financial analyses performed by client’s financial advisor were
material information to minority shareholders making informed appraisal deci-
sion); Miller, supra note 86 (citing In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 203) (suggesting
more robust disclosures are required for shareholders to make informed decision
whether to accept proposed merger).
Further, the court in Berger limited the situations in which the valuation meth-
odology disclosure requirement would apply. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 136 (sug-
gesting in other short-form situations majority shareholder would not be required
to disclose valuation methodology).  For example, had Pubco been a registered
company or had Pubco’s disclosures not been so grossly inadequate, there may
have been no requirement to disclose the method of valuation. See Miller, supra
note 86 (noting Delaware Supreme Court took no issue with Chancery Court’s
findings in regards to disclosure requirement); Nussbaum, supra note 19 (explain-
ing Berger’s holding is limited to short-form mergers accompanied by material dis-
closure violations).
Additionally, the court suggests that technical as opposed to substantive dis-
closure violations may not be subject to the same, opt-out, no escrow, quasi-ap-
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ers to independently value shares would make it difficult for them to make
an informed decision as to whether to seek appraisal.116
2. The Need for Appropriate Disclosures
More appropriate disclosure requirements are necessary to ensure
that minority shareholders can make informed appraisal decisions in
short-form merger situations.117  This is not to suggest that the Berger court
was wrong in not requiring more detailed valuation disclosures.118  In fact,
even the required disclosure of the valuation methodology itself may be
unnecessary.119  Instead, minority shareholders need more detailed finan-
cial and operating disclosures relating to the company itself so that they
may perform independent valuations.120
B. Revisiting the Quasi-appraisal Procedure
Although Delaware courts need to require more appropriate disclo-
sures to ensure that minority shareholders can make more informed ap-
praisal decisions, doing so may overburden majority shareholders due to
the quasi-appraisal remedy applied in Berger.121  Given the current opt-out
praisal remedy. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 145 (“If only a technical and non-prejudicial
violation of [Title 8, Section 253] had occurred, the result might be different.”); see
also Aronstam & Ross, supra note 71, at 24 (“Importantly, however, the Supreme
Court suggested that less expansive quasi-appraisal relief may be appropriate for
technical disclosure violations, such as where stockholders receive an incomplete
copy of the appraisal statute with their notice of merger.”). Contra Berger, 976 A.2d
at 144 (“[F]airness requires that the corporation be held to the same strict stan-
dard of compliance with the appraisal statute as the minority shareholders.”).
116. For a further discussion of the purpose of the duty of disclosure and
material information, see supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
117. For a further discussion of the inadequacy of the disclosure require-
ments in Berger, see supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
118. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 136 (“This does not mean that Kanner should have
provided picayune details about the process he used to set the price; it simply
means he should have disclosed in a broad sense what the process was . . . .” (quot-
ing Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civil Action No. 3414-CC, 2008 WL 2224107, at *3 (Del.
Ch. 2008))).
119. See In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 203 (suggesting company information is
more important to investors than valuation inputs).  Even without knowledge of
the valuation methodology used by the parent corporation, if given sufficient fi-
nancial and operating information, minority shareholders can come up with an
accurate valuation of the company using any number of valuation modeling tech-
niques. See id. (“Investors can come up with their own estimates of discount rates
or . . . market multiples.  What they cannot hope to do is replicate management’s
inside view of the company’s prospects.”).  Notably, as the defendant in Berger cor-
rectly argued, the short-form merger statute does not require the use of any sophis-
ticated valuation methodology; therefore, it is possible valuation details cannot be
provided because they do not exist. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 136 (accepting defen-
dant’s assertion that any valuation method can be used no matter how absurd).
120. See In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 203 (discussing information necessary for
minority shareholders to perform independent valuation).
121. See Hossfeld, supra note 3, at 1359 (noting generally appraisal remedies
should seek to balance risks of oppression by majority against harassment by mi-
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quasi-appraisal procedure, increasing disclosure requirements would sub-
ject parent corporations to increased litigation risk.122  Therefore, to allow
the judiciary to consider imposing more appropriate disclosure require-
ments in short-form merger situations, Delaware courts must first revisit
the quasi-appraisal remedy established in Berger.123
1. The Opt-out Requirement
The opt-out requirement is too burdensome to parent corporations
in short-form merger situations, given the need for more robust disclosure
requirements.124  The supreme court in Berger found that the alternative
opt-in requirement is potentially burdensome to minority shareholders de-
siring to seek an appraisal recovery because it poses a risk of forfeiture.125
However, this risk of forfeiture is no different from the forfeiture exper-
ienced by a minority shareholder in a statutory appraisal situation who
chooses to vote for the merger or not to elect appraisal.126
In an appraisal proceeding, minority stockholders who seek appraisal
must demand it, and only those minority stockholders that demand ap-
praisal are entitled to receive the judicially determined fair value of their
shares.127  Consequently, in a statutory appraisal proceeding, minority
stockholders who take no action receive the merger price, regardless of
the outcome of the judicial appraisal.128  The opt-in approach in Gilliland,
however, applied less stringent opt-in requirements than statutory ap-
nority); see also Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 6 (explaining litigation costs could
increase dramatically for parent corporations if quasi-appraisal becomes widely
available to address post-closing disclosure claims).
122. See Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 2 (noting quasi-appraisal should be
limited to “avoid tipping the balance of law too heavily in favor of post-transaction
price litigation”).  The Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Berger removed risks
to minority shareholders previously associated with appraisal and therefore will
encourage increased litigation. See Nussbaum, supra note 19 (theorizing quasi-ap-
praisal remedy established by Berger could result in increased post-merger
litigation).
123. For a further discussion of the need for more appropriate disclosure re-
quirements, see supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.  For a further discus-
sion of the need to revisit the quasi-appraisal remedy, see infra notes 125–41 and
accompanying text.
124. For a further discussion of the increased burdens of quasi-appraisal on
parent corporations, see supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
125. See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 143 (Del. 2009) (indicating if
minority shareholders fail to appropriately opt in, they forfeit opportunity to seek
appraisal).
126. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2013) (codifying requirements of
shareholder approval in long-form merger transactions); see also Hossfeld, supra
note 3, at 1338 (explaining required procedures for perfection of statutory ap-
praisal rights).
127. See Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 313 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(describing statutory appraisal procedure).
128. See id. (describing statutory appraisal procedure to be reflected by quasi-
appraisal); see also Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 6 (discussing rationale of Gilli-
land approach).
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praisal.129  These less stringent requirements would alleviate some of the
perceived risks of forfeiture as compared to statutory appraisal.130  Ulti-
mately, the imposition of the opt-out proceeding is a greater burden to
the parent corporation than an opt-in requirement would be to a minority
shareholder interested in pursing appraisal.131  Therefore, an opt-in re-
quirement similar to statutory appraisal or under Gilliland’s less stringent
standard would better balance the majority shareholders’ interest with the
minority shareholders’ rights than the opt-out applied in Berger.132
2. The Escrow Requirement
The escrow requirement is not necessary to protect the rights of mi-
nority shareholders, and is also not essential to support the majority’s in-
terest in unilaterally effectuating a short-form merger.133  The escrow
requirement operates to expose the minority to the same risk inherent in
statutory appraisal and to ensure the parent corporation can reclaim a
portion of the merger proceeds should the judicially determined value of
the shares be less than the merger price.134  As this requirement does not
serve the rights of the minority shareholders or the interest of the major-
ity, the supreme court in Berger decided this issue on the basis of fair-
ness.135  As the court notes, fairness requires that the minority and
majority shareholders be held to the same strict standards of compliance
with the appraisal and short-form merger statute, respectively.136  Minority
shareholders who fail to properly perfect their statutory appraisal rights as
required by the technical procedures mandated in the appraisal statute
129. See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313 (discussing opt-in requirements of quasi-
appraisal).  For example, in Gilliland, as in Berger, the court did not require benefi-
cial owners to request quasi-appraisal through their record holder as is required in
statutory appraisal. See id. (expressing concern that shareholders would have diffi-
culty ensuring cooperation of former record holders); see also Geis, supra note 2, at
1642 (discussing benefits of Berger court not requiring minority shareholders to act
through record holders).
130. See tit. 8, § 262(d) (discussing procedure to perfect statutory appraisal
rights).  For a further discussion of the less stringent opt-in requirements discussed
in Gilliland, see supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
131. See Schumer et al., supra note 3, at 5 (noting burden of exposure to un-
foreseen class-wide litigation would disincentivize parent corporations from pursu-
ing short-form mergers).
132. See id. (describing burdens of opt-out quasi-appraisal proceeding on ma-
jority shareholder).
133. See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313 (discussing purpose of escrow requirement
is to “replicate a modicum of risk” inherent in statutory appraisal proceeding).
134. See id. (discussing rationale for escrow requirement).
135. See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 144 (Del. 2009) (discussing
rationale for rejection of escrow requirement).
136. See id. (“[F]airness requires that the corporation be held to the same
strict standard of compliance with the appraisal statute as the minority
shareholders.”).
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lose their right to appraisal.137  Therefore, as the supreme court held in
Berger, majority shareholders should also suffer a forfeiture should they fail
to comply with the technical requirements of the short-form merger
statute.138
The protection of minority shareholders’ rights to make an informed
appraisal decision is best addressed by requiring more adequate financial
and operating disclosures.139  Further, the interest of majority sharehold-
ers in unilaterally removing the minority interest is most burdened by cre-
ating a class-wide remedy for the entire minority.140  Therefore, the court
in Berger properly rejected the escrow requirement because it is unneces-
sary to protect the minority’s rights and inessential to the majority’s
interest.141
V. CONCLUSION
The Chancery Court has been troubled by the increasing trend of
post-merger disclosure-based litigation.142  Vice Chancellor Laster has
137. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2013) (codifying requirements of
shareholder approval in long-form merger transactions); see also Berger, 976 A.2d at
144 (discussing forfeiture by minority for failing to strictly comply with appraisal
statute).
138. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 144 (applying fairness reasoning in rationale for
rejecting escrow requirement).  The Delaware Supreme Court noted that minority
shareholders would receive a dual benefit from not having to escrow the merger
proceeds because they were permitted to use the proceeds received, which they
could possibly owe back to the parent corporation in the future, while simultane-
ously litigating for additional merger consideration. See id. 143–44 (noting dual
benefit of shareholders retaining merger proceeds).  However, the court found
the dual benefit neither unfair nor inequitable. See id. (“[D]oes that make [the
dual benefit] inequitable from the fiduciary’s standpoint?  We think not.”); Aron-
stam & Ross, supra note 71, at 23 (discussing court’s analysis of dual benefit to
minority shareholders).
139. For a further discussion of the need for more appropriate disclosure re-
quirements, see supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.
140. For a further discussion of the burdens of an opt-out appraisal proce-
dure on parent corporations, see supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
141. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 144 (holding quasi-appraisal remedy would not
require minority shareholders to escrow any portion of merger proceeds).  The
rationale for the escrow requirement in Gilliland was that the quasi-appraisal rem-
edy should replicate the risk inherent to minority shareholders in statutory ap-
praisal. See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313 (“[T]his quasi-appraisal action should be
structured to replicate a modicum of the risk that would inhere if this were an
actual appraisal action . . . .”).  The Delaware Supreme Court in Berger made a
more compelling argument, however, that just as minority shareholders who fail to
observe the technical requirements of the appraisal statute forfeit their right to
recover the fair value of their shares, parent corporations who fail to observe the
technical requirements of the short-form merger statute should forfeit their right
to the protections afforded to them under that statute. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 144
(discussing rationale for rejection of escrow requirement).
142. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–12, Stourbridge Inv. LLC v.
Bersoff, C.A. No. 7300-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2012) (discussing troubling trend in
disclosure litigation).
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noted the possibility of exploitation of parent corporations by minority
shareholders through the use of disclosure claims.143  Conversely, com-
mentators have highlighted the importance of the use of appraisal juris-
prudence to protect minority shareholders from overreaching by the
majority.144
The legitimate concerns for protecting both minority and majority
shareholders in short-form merger situations call for a balanced equitable
remedy when a breach of fiduciary duty is found.145  The current Dela-
ware jurisprudence does not provide the necessary, balanced, quasi-ap-
praisal remedy.146  As the imposition of fiduciary duties and the
construction of equitable remedies are responsibilities of the judiciary,
Delaware courts should revisit the holding of Berger and attempt to de-
velop a more balanced remedy.147
143. See id. (noting externalities of disclosure jurisprudence that are being
exploited).
144. See Coleman, supra note 13, at 777 (explaining appraisal proceedings
prevent majority shareholders from abusing their favorable position in merger
transactions); see also Geis, supra note 2, at 1642 (“[T]he appraisal remedy has been
rehabilitated as a defense against abusive freezeout mergers by majority
shareholders.”).
145. For a further discussion of the need to protect majority shareholders
from disclosure claims, see supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.  For a fur-
ther discussion of the need to protect minority shareholders in freeze-out situa-
tions, see supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the
need for a balanced quasi-appraisal remedy, see supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
146. For a further discussion of the inadequacies of the current quasi-ap-
praisal remedy, see supra notes 113–38 and accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion of the need for more appropriate disclosure re-
quirements and a change in the current quasi-appraisal procedure, see supra notes
113–38 and accompanying text.
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